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Fighting Political Terrorism by Refusing
Recognition*
B R U N O S. FREY Economics, University of Zurich
A B S T R A C T
Terrorists act rationally; one of their dominating goals is to attract public
attention to their cause. As a consequence, the authorities should refrain
from attributing a particular terrorist incident to any one group. They
should stress that many different actors must be considered as the possible
perpetrators. Such an information policy sharply reduces terrorists'
rewards. The terrorists are therefore likely to cut down on such activities
or must undertake riskier acts, which increase their chance of being
caught. The approach suggested is complementary to the policies
currently in use; it does not make police measures unnecessary. The
strategy is, however, active while the traditional approaches are passive
responses to terrorist activities. In contrast to other anti-terrrorist
measures, it does not violate human liberties, civil rights or the freedom of
the press.
This paper presents a new element in the strategy of fighting terrorism. It
is assumed that terrorists act rationally and that their main goal is to
attract public attention to their cause. A policy of information by the
authorities which refrains from making any particular group responsible
for a certain terrorist act and explicity takes all the possible actors into
consideration therefore reduces the terrorists' rewards. They either have
to switch to more overt activities which increases the risk of being caught
or they desist from further terrorism. This strategy, being active in
opposition to the traditional methods, forces the terrorists to react.
I am grateful for helpful discussions to James M. Buchanan, Jose Antonio Blanco, Reiner
Eichenberger, Klaus Foppa, Francesco Forte, Beat Gygi, Douglas Hibbs, Peter Graf Kielmann-
segg, Cornelia Klinger, Serge Kolm, Barbara Krug, Franz Ritzmann, Hannelore Weck-
Hannemann and Charles Wolf. The idea was presented at the Study Group on Economics,
Psychology and Sociology (OEPSAG), at the Internal Seminar on Economic Policy at the Institute
for Empirical Economic Research, and at the Departmental Research Seminar.
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180 Bruno S. Frey
I. Helplessness
Over the last dozen years political terrorism has become more important
than ever. The incidents range from kidnapping individuals and hijacking
collective means of transportation (planes, ships and even trains) to
bombings. Kidnapping of prominent individuals such as the president of
the German Employers' Association Hanns Martin Schleyer in 1977 or of
the Italian ex prime minister Aldo Moro in 1978 have resulted in deadly
outcomes, and many innocent by-standers have been killed in other acts of
terrorism. Accordingly, terrorist acts have received great attention in the
media: there is 'virtually a 100 per cent probability of achieving
worldwide or at least national publicity' (Jenkins and Ronfeldt 1977, p.
1). The estimated world-wide media audience of a significant terrorist act
is 500,000,000, i.e. terrorists can count on 'a public opinion prize probably
unmatched in history' (Watson 1976, p. 195). Signs of hysteria have
appeared. The fight against political terrorism has had considerable
repercussions on most societies: new police groups have been established,
and new techniques of investigation and search have been introduced. As
a result the human rights and civil liberties have been curtailed, and in
times of acute terror have been openly violated.1
The reaction of the authorities to this wave of political terrorism can be
described as inadequate, and even helpless (see e.g. Crelinsten and Szabo
1980, pp. 81-3). The fact that not more people have been killed seems to
be more the result of luck than of good management of the crises by the
authorities. The authorities have tended to resort to illegal or at least
illegitimate means to fight terrorism. Morever, they have allowed the
terrorists and their causes to get prominent attention (and thus have
helped to achieve one of the main goals of political terrorists), and have
even gone so far as to negotiate with the terrorists on an equal footing,
violating the constitutional principle that the state has to maintain the
monopoly of force in society.
This paper suggests a new strategy to deal with political terrorism
which avoids some of the major disadvantages of current policies. In
particular, the civil liberties of the population remain intact while terrorist
acts may be expected to decrease significantly. Terrorists' behaviour and
the workings of the new strategy for fighting them are discussed in section
II. Possible objections are dealt with in section III. The following section
compares the new strategy to the currently used one, and section V offers
concluding remarks.
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Fighting Political Terrorism by Refusing Recognition 181
II . The stategy outlined
1. The behaviour of terrorists
Terrorists do not act without purpose, rather they are goal oriented actors
(Stohl 1979, pp. 6-7). Political terrorists want to draw public attention to
their cause, and/or want to achieve specific political demands (such as the
release of imprisoned members of their group). Media recognition is
absolutely crucial; the success of a terrorist act depends mainly on the
media coverage it enjoys: 'Terrorist action is nothing, publicity is
everything' (Laqueur 1978, p. 225; 1977, p. 105). A 'vital factor [for the
proliferation of international terrorism] is the impact of modern
communications media. Terrorists are today given free world-wide
publicity' (Wilkinson 1974, p. 124).2 One may even speak of an 'implicit
theatrical nature of terrorism' (Corsi 1981, p. 48) in which 'the mass
media take a vital role' (Crelinsten and Szabo 1980, p. 89).
Terrorists act to achieve their goals by considering the benefits and
costs associated with alternative actions. When there are two actions
available (say kidnapping a prominent politician or throwing a bomb
indiscriminately in a gathering of people) they will choose the one which
yields higher benefits in terms of achieving the goals, or which entails
lower costs in terms of material needed and risk of being captured,
wounded or killed.
In this (limited) sense terrorists may be taken to act rationally.3
Terrorists are neither madman4 nor is their behaviour random, rather it is
systematic and, in principle, predictable. This view of terrorists is in line
with previous analyses (see in particular Landes 1978; Sandier,
Tschirhart and Cauley 1983; Kirk 1983; Atkinson, Sandier and
Tschirhart 1987; Sandier and Scott 1987). It accords well with reality:
terrorists are known for careful preparations of their acts, gathering
information and meticulously planning the procedure. It has been shown
in careful investigations (Mickolus 1980, Gurr 1979) that political
terrorists systematically react to changes in factors such as risk and the
probability of a clash with the authorities. Terrorist activities with high
risk like hijacking and hostage-taking occur the least often while activities
with low risk like bombings and assassinations occur the most often.
2. Refusing recognition
Based on this view of terrorists' behaviour, they can be discouraged from
acting by reducing their utility of goal attainment. The authorities in
charge must in particular ascertain that a particular group of terrorists do
not receive the credit and therewith the public attention for having
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182 Bruno S. Frey
committed a terrorist act. The authorities must see to it that the terrorist
act is not attributed to those people who have undertaken it and who have
made the respective effort and taken the risk. There are two strategies for
refusing to attribute a terrorist act to a particular group:
1i) All information on terrorist activities is suppressed; the authorities
behave and talk as if no such terrorist act has happened.5 In an open and
free society it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to withhold
information in which the media is highly interested. In effect, the freedom
of the press is seriously limited either by 'voluntary' agreement or by law.
As the foreign press and news media are not bound by such agreements
and laws, it is, at least in a democracy, most likely that the news leaks out.
The terrorists can easily inform foreign news agencies which, due to the
competitive pressure to provide interesting news, will normally be ready
to inform the international public about the terrorist act. This first
strategy must therefore be rejected as being ineffective and incompatible
with democracy.
(2) The information available to the public may be 'thinned'. This can
be done by making it known that several terrorist groups may be responsible
for a particular terrorist act. The authorities have to reveal that they never
know with certainty who has committed a terrrorist act. Even when it
seems obvious what terrorist group is involved, the police can never be
sure because it may be a politically opposed group who has committed the
act in order to incriminate the more 'obvious' groups, and invite police
action against the latter. Rather the authorities have various hypotheses
to which they attach various degrees of belief. They must communicate
this probability distribution of possible actors to the public. They have to
refrain from attributing a terrorist act to any particular group as long as
the truth is not established. In a lawful country, this is the privilege of the
courts, but not of the police.
Usually, there are several groups claiming to have committed a
particular terrorist act. There are cases in which the media have
attributed it to some innocent terrorist group, as it later turned out
(Laqueur 1977, p. 106). The authorities have to stress that any one of
them may be the responsible one. As a consequence, the various media
draw the public's attention to many different, and possibly conflicting,
political goals. In the unlikely case that only one group claims to have
committed the terrorist act, the authorities responsible have to point out
that such a claim is not substantiated and that experience teaches that
several different groups may have undertaken the act, but choose to be
silent. They may point out that many cases are known where groups have
claimed to have committed particular terrorist acts in order to draw the
attention of the mass media to themselves. Thus even in the case of only
one claimant, those having committed the act receive only part of the
publicity involved, and possibly a small part only.
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Fighting Political Terrorism by Refusing Recognition 183
3. Effects
The information strategy outlined has systematic and hence predictable
effects on the behaviour of both terrorists and responsible authorities. The
benefits derived from having committed a terrorist act decreases for the
group having undertaken it because the group does not reap the public
attention hoped for. The political goals it wants to publicise are not
propagated as much as they desire. This reduction in publicity makes the
terrorist act (to a certain degree) senseless: 'all modern terrorist
movements require publicity' (Laqueur 1977, p. 106) .6 Terrorists who are
ready to take the high risk - and even the risk of death - in order to put
forth their political beliefs feel deeply dissatisfied. The frustration is
intensified by the feeling that other political groups who were not as
'brave' as to have run the risk to undertake terrorist acts are free riders and
reap benefits in terms of increased publicity free of charge. This
frustration is often intense because terrorist groups tend to be in a state of
strong competition, even when they have similar political beliefs. None of
them is ready to accept that it undertakes dangerous actions but that
another group receives the credit for it. Most terrorist groups would prefer
that no one is credited than that the publicity is shared by a competing
group. The authorities in charge fighting terrorism may exploit this
competition among terrorist groups by pointing out to the media that
among the likely authors of a particular terrorist act there may be terrorist
groups known to be in competition with each other.
The authorities' strategy resulting in a strong decrease in the rewards
for terrorist acts, the terrorist groups concerned may react in three
possible ways:
(1) The terrorists make an effort to establish the authorship in a
terrorist act by providing appropriate 'proofs'. This can, for instance, be
done by providing photographs (e.g. showing a hostage with a newspaper
of a particular date as was done in the case of the kidnapping of Schleyer in
Germany). The authorities, knowing well that such photographs are easy
to fake, will have to point out that this is no adequate 'proof, and in many
instances they can indicate that similar 'proofs' have been presented by
other claimants. While the initial attempt to establish authorship
undoubtedly receives public attention, this will also be true for the
possible counter-evidence provided by the authorities. Another possibil-
ity for establishing a 'proof is by getting into direct contact with
journalists. Such action involves considerable risks because the terrorists
have to partially come into the open which renders them an easier target
for normal police activity. The terrorists can, for example, not exclude
that one of thejournalists they make contact with informs the police about
a planned meeting. The authorities have, moreover, counter-strategies
available: they can reveal what evidence they possess, suggesting that a
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184 Bruno S. Frey
competing terrorist group may well have committed the terrorist act
concerned.
(2) The terrorists switch to a more overt type of terrorist activity in
order to make sure that its authorship is established beyond doubt. Such
behaviour increases the risk of being caught by the police.
(3) The terrorists desist from further terrorist activity because it does
not pay and switch to a non-violent way of publicising their demands.
It may be noted that each one of the three types of reaction result in a
decrease of terrorism either because the terrorists choose to so act or
because the police get a better position to detect and overwhelm them.
The strategy here suggested also leads to a change in the behaviour of
the authorities. Most importantly, as long as the authorship of a terrorist
act is not clearly established, they do not have to yield to the demands
made. As long as they can argue that they do not know which of the con-
flicting demands should be fulfilled, they do not even have to reject the
demands. In the case of kidnappings this means that there is little risk that
the terrorists respond by killing the hostages as they would not gain any-
thing by doing so. Thus, no ransom money has to be paid. If political ter-
rorists demand that some announcement is read on TV or published in
newspapers, this may even be granted, provided several announcements
by different terrorist groups are arranged, a fact which strongly reduces
the effect of any particular announcement.
To summarise, the following results may be expected from applying the
strategy suggested: the authorities take the initiative by actively taking
steps to reduce the attention the terrorists receive from the public. The
terrorists become frustrated by the missing reward from the risky terrorist
acts, desist from further activities, or increasingly expose themselves to
ordinary counter-terrorists methods by the police. The amount of
terrorism will decrease; the dissatisfaction with existing political and
social conditions will be expressed in different, less violent ways.7
I I I . Possible objections
The strategy of refusing recognition by supplying more information than
desired by the terrorists may be objected to on various grounds.
1. Cost of non-commitment
The public expects, and has a right, to be truthfully informed by the
authorities on public affairs, including terrorism. The strategy of refusing
recognition by leaving all possibilities open until truth is established in
court may possibly appear to the citizens as if information were withheld,
because not one particular terrorist group is presented as the author of a
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Fighting Political Terrorism by Refusing Recognition 185
particular act. In order to overcome this (mistaken) feeling, the
authorities must make it clear that there are by necessity always a number
of different suspects and that in a democratic society it is the courts' sole
authority to establish who is guilty. The fact that there are more or less
likely authors does not allow concentration on only one of them.
2. Limited applicability
The strategy based on refusing recognition is relevant for clandestine
terrorist act such as kidnapping with an unknown hiding place and
bombings. This is an advantage rather than a disadvantage because 'most
expert knowledge to date deals with hostage situations in which the site of
the hostage is known. Where the site is unknown, operational strategies
and tactics are much less clear-cut and well-developed' (Crelinsten and
Szabo 1980, p. 81). The strategy is not so well applicable for overt
kidnapping where the hostages are kept at a publicity known place. The
authorities can still argue that the kidnappers, say of a plane or ship, are
not fully identified, and that there are competing claims on who they really
are and what cause they really champion. However, the possibility of
using such a strategy is more limited than in the case of clandestine
terrorist activities. The strategy suggested is complementary, and not
substitutive, to ordinary police activities. Open terrorist actions can be
fought by classical police methods such as attacks by appropriately
trained and armed forces.
The strategy is also inapplicable if terrorists' behaviour were solely
motivated by creating chaos. In that case terrorists derive no utility if their
movement and their political goals are identified. The literature (see
footnote 1) does not indicate, however, that such a utility function is
widespread, if it exists at all.
3. Unwillingness to use the strategy
The politicians and the police chiefs responsible may be reluctant to apply
the strategy of refusing recognition because it gives the impression to the
public that the authorities are incompetent as they do not appear to know
which group is responsible for the terrorist act concerned. The politicians
and public authorities in charge prefer to state that they are well informed
and that they will soon be able to capture the terrorists, even if this is more
wishful thinking than reality. The strategy has, moreover, the disadvan-
tage that the decline in terrorism brought about by the choice of the
terrorist groups is not directly attributed to the police and other public
authorities. Both would, of course, prefer to be directly credited.
The small incentives for the official decision-makers to apply the
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186 Bruno S. Frey
strategy is a serious problem. A competent government may, however, be
able to attribute the success of the anti-terrorist policy to their actions and
particularly by pointing out its success. In times of crisis, which often
obtains when terrorism mounts, the parties in a democracy tend to form
an implicit or even explicit coalition with respect to anti-terror policy; the
government is insulated during this period from usual party competition
and can, if it desires, pursue the strategy suggested. The government can
also show its determination to fight terrorism by pointing out its use of
classical police methods.
It is, however, not necessary to rely only on the enlightened self-interest
of the government. Laws prohibiting an unproven accusation of having
committed a terrorist act may be introduced or strengthened, and it must
apply also to the public authorities, including the police. As a result, the
authorities would be more careful to attribute a terrorist act to a particular
group but would be forced also to indicate other possible actors. The laws
would firmly establish that only the courts may establish who is guilty.
Once the courts have decided, the group actually having committed the
crime gains the undivided publicity, but this is long after the terrorist act
has taken place. In a world characterised by many news items and among
them many atrocities, the amount of attention paid by the mass media and
the public is considerably smaller than it would have been at the time of
the terrorist act.
IV. Comparison to current anti-terrorist policy
There are six major differences between the strategy of refusing
recognition and the policy currently used:
1i) The strategy is active, the authorities force the terrorists to react.
The currently used anti-terrorist policy is, on the other hand, reactive, the
terrorists dictate the procedure and the terms under which the interaction
takes place.
(2) The strategy refuses to give terrorists the rewards going with public
attention. The current policy tends to publicise and officially acknowledge
the existence of the terrorist group and therewith its cause.
(3) The strategy allows the authorities not to yield to the demands
raised by the terrorists without running an increased risk. The current
policy seeks a favourable outcome by negotiating about the terms of the
demands with the terrorists on an equal level. The consequence tends to
be that the terrorists commit further violence in order to ensure that their
demands are met.
(4) The strategy lowers the rewards of terrorist actions which also
reduces the incentives to terrorists for future terrorism. The current
terrorist policy invites future terrorism in so far as it has met terrorist
demands in the past.
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
01
43
81
4X
00
00
52
25
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 1
1:
05
:4
3,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
Fighting Political Terrorism by Refusing Recognition 187
(5) The strategy does not touch the freedom of the press and of the
other media. Current anti-terrorist policy is usually accompanied by a
suppression or reduction of free reporting.
(6) The strategy does not infringe on human rights and civil liberties.
The current anti-terrorist policy with its emphasis on heavy use of police
power and on modern methods of investigation and surveillance is bound
to reduce citizens' rights.
V. Concluding remarks
The discussion suggests that a fight of terrorism based on the refusal to
acknowledge terrorists by oversupplying information may be a useful
extension to existing policies. It has become clear that it is not alternative
in the sense that it would make police action unnecessary. It is, however, a
clear alternative with respect to how information is to be handled.
Anti-terror practitioners would have to find the exact ways to imple-
ment the new kind of information policy put forward theoretically. The
strategy may be openly discussed, its effect does not depend on the fact
that the opponents (the terrorists) do not know it. Rather it is one of the
remarkable features that it is largely immune to counterstrategies.
NOTES
1. For a survey of forms and trends of present day terrorism see, among a large literature, e.g.
Wilkinson 1987; Cordes et al. 1984; Mickolus 1980, 1982; Corsi 1981; Jenkins 1982; Midlarsky,
Crenshaw and Yoshida 1980; Alexander, Carlton and Wilkinson 1979.
2. 'Modern terrorists . . . seek to use spectacular acts of terrorism as a dramatic and effective means
of publicizing both their cause and the movement to specific governments and to world opinion'
(Wilkinson 1977, p. 111).
3. Under present conditions terrorism does not seem to be an unprofitable enterprise. For example, in
the period 1968 to 1984 in which 549 hostage-taking events were counted, in 475 or 87% of the
cases the mission was completed as planned, and in 147 cases (27%) all of their demands were
moreover met (Sandier and Scott 1987). For further figures concerning the success rates of various
terrorist activities over the period 1968 to 1974 see Milbank (1976, p. 22).
4. According to Miller (1979) it is not true that terrorists are not concerned about their lives. Also
captured terrorists have elaborate plans for escape. Stohl (1979, p. 5) writes of a 'myth, one that
finds particularly warm reception in the American media and in governmental statements
concerning terrorism, is that terrorists are mentally unbalanced . . . only madmen would resort to
many of the actions that terrorists have undertaken. . . . Rarely are actions of terrorists presented
as part of an on-going political struggle, related to any particular goals, and rarely are these goals
presented as reasonable or even meaningful'.
5. This is the typical response of Israel to PLO terror. It indicates a governmental unwillingness to
reward terrorists for their actions or even to acknowledge their existence (Stohl 1979, p. 394).
6. The lack of publicity was the major reason why the guerrilla moved from the country to the cities
during the 60s. In a city, the terrorists can always count on the presence ofjournalists, TV cameras
and a large crowd. This lesson was quickly learned by South American, Arabic and African
guerrillas. As one Algerian guerrilla leader said: 'Is it better for our cause to kill ten of our enemies
in a far away village without receiving attention, or to kill somebody in Algier where the American
and European press reports the incidents the next day securing world wide attention?' (See
Laqueur 1977, pp. 105/106).
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188 Bruno S. Frey
7. It has been shown (CIA 1981) that measures taken in the past to increase the cost of types of
terrorist activities have motivated terrorists to switch to less costly activities. As an increase in cost
is equivalent to a decrease in benefits, this substitution effect has empirically been observed.
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